

iGPU Leak

An Information Leakage Vulnerability on Intel Integrated GPU

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


Outline




- Introduction
- iGPU Leak Vulnerability
- Proof-of-concept Demo
- Attack Case Studies
- Discussion and Conclusion

Intel Skylake (Client)



Intel Integrated GPU (iGPU)



Gen9 GPU
+
Media Capabilities

- Large area on die
- Ubiquity
- Complex functions
 - GPGPU

Up to 71% PCs use iGPU. [1]

! Insufficient Security Scrutiny

Introduction



iGPU Leak

Proof-of-concept Demo

Attack Case Studies

Discussion and Conclusion

Vulnerability Analysis on Intel iGPU

Threat model:

- Unprivileged GPU client
- Software-based

Identify an uninitialized hardware vulnerability

1.
GPU Shared
Local Memory
Leak


2.
GPU
Register Leak

Uninitialized Data

What is an uninitialized data bug?

Steps:

1. Program 1 uses some memory.




Uninitialized Data

What is an uninitialized data bug?

Steps:


1. Program 1 uses some memory.
2. Program returns the memory space to OS.



Uninitialized Data


Steps:

1. Program 1 uses some memory.
2. Program returns the memory space to OS.
3. OS gives the memory region to Program 2,
without clearing the memory.



Intel iGPU

1. Shared Local Memory (SLM)




LLC: Last-level Cache

GTI: Graphic Technology Interface

Intel iGPU μ Arch

2. GPU General-purpose Register File (GRF)




$$1 \text{ slice} \times 3 \text{ subslices} \times 8 \text{ EUs} \times 7 \text{ threads} \times 4 \text{ KB} = 672 \text{ KB}$$

GPU Programming

Goal: Userland GPU Spyware

Challenge: GPU programming



SLM Leak

OpenCL code for Shared Local Memory (SLM) leakage

```
void DumpSLM ( __global uint *out )  
{  
    __local uint slm[N];  
    for( size_t i=0; i<N; ++i )  
        out[base+i] = slm[i];  
}
```

OpenCL

Compile

Execute

Userland

Hardware

iGPU

Display

Video

3D

Command Streamer

Slice

Subslice

SLM

Subslice

Subslice


L3

GTI

Memory
(CPU
readable)

Register Leak

Assembly programming for GPU register leakage:



Introduction


iGPU Leak



PoC Demo

Attack Case Studies

Discussion and Conclusion



Model	Dell OptiPlex 7040
CPU	Intel Core i7 6700
iGPU	Intel HD 530 (Gen 9)
OS	Ubuntu 16.04 LTS / 18.04 LTS
OpenCL	Intel Graphics Compute Runtime 19.26

[\[Youtube\] SLM Leak](#) [\[Youtube\] GRF Leak](#)

Introduction

iGPU Leak

PoC Demo



Case Studies

Discussion and Conclusion

1. Attacker does not know the source code

Website Fingerprinting Attack

2. Attacker knows implementation details

AES Key Recovery Attack

3. Leakage bandwidth measurement

Covert Channel

1. Website Fingerprinting





Table: Experiment Configuration

Browser	Chrome 73.0.3683.103
Setting	Factory default
OS	Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
Websites	Alexa Top 40

1. Website Fingerprinting

1.1 Training dataset




1. Website Fingerprinting




1.2 Inference

On average,
0.33 s \approx 3000 samples



1. Website Fingerprinting




1. Accuracy of different models.


RF	Random forest
CNN	Conv. neural network
MLP	Multilayer perceptron

* 3 inferences per second


1. Website Fingerprinting



1. Accuracy of different models.




2. Accuracy vs. inference frequency.



3. Model duration against changes on the webpages over time

2. AES Attack

Assume: Attacker knows the GPU program of the victim.
Goal: AES key.



AES encryption flowchart of a GPU extension of openssl [1]


Property:

Knowing any Round key[i], one can reverse the AES key.

2. AES Attack

Victim's GPU
program of AES

Analyze its GPU assembly




- Value in the register is preserved
- Value is overwritten

GPU register flow graph

AES Attack


Victim	Result
AES-128	Leaked 13 / 16 Bytes
	0.15 s brute-force
AES-196	Leaked 20 / 24 Bytes
	2 min brute-force



Leaked key byte = $r26 \oplus r32$

3. Covert Channel

Bandwidth measurement



Register	Simplex	4 Gbps
	Duplex	8 Gbps
SLM	Simplex	1.3 Gbps
	Duplex	2.5 Gbps

Introduction


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Discussion: Mitigation



Conclusion

- iGPU Leak: a dangerous vulnerability
- Privacy / Confidentiality / Covert channel
- Insufficient consideration of new peripherals
- Exposure: CVE-2019-14615
- Affected products & Patch status:

Affected Products	Affected OS	Patch
Many Intel processor families	Win	Intel Graphics DCH Driver 26.20.100.7209
	Linux	To be released in 2020 Jan.

Please refer to [INTEL-SA-00314](#) for details.

THANK YOU

Q & A